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Are there predictable cycles in exchange-rate regimes? Can these cycles be 
predicted in terms of the rules-versus-discretion theory of monetary policy? 
The experience of  the last one hundred years provides a fascinating testing 
ground  for  this  hypothesis.  The  classical gold  standard was  disrupted by 
World  War  I. After that,  the majority of  countries in the world returned to 
gold. The subsequent abandonment of  gold occurred at a time of  unprece- 
dented economic and financial instability and was followed by  beggar-thy- 
neighbor trade policies and further political and economic instability. After 
World War 11, fixed exchange rates were reestablished. They broke down with 
the Viet Nam era and the oil shock but are being pursued again by European 
countries, both within and outside the European Community. 
These events seem to suggest that floating rates are temporary arrangements 
that are resorted to whenever large enough shocks hit the world economy but 
that, in the absence of  shocks, countries go back to fixed rates. The rules- 
versus-discretion theory says that fixed exchange rates provide valuable com- 
mitments  to  national  monetary  authorities.  Governments  abandon  these 
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commitments  only when exogenous  shocks make it too onerous to “tie the 
hands” of monetary authorities. 
In recent years, the theory of rules and discretion in monetary policy has 
fascinated scores of academic economists and policymakers alike. This paper 
asks whether it can be applied to understand the history of the world monetary 
system, by  focusing on the setup and the experience of the Bretton Woods 
regime and comparing it with its predecessors, in particular the classical gold 
standard. Section 2.1 discusses the underpinnings, and some of the problems, 
of  a theory  of the evolution of  the  international monetary regime based  on 
alternating rules and discretion. Section 2.2 describes the rules that character- 
ized the classical gold standard and the motivations  to return  to gold  in the 
interwar period.  Section 2.3 evaluates-in  light of the theories discussed in 
section 2.1-the  British and U.S.  plan for world monetary reform published 
in 1943 and discusses the IMF Articles of Agreement. Section 2.4 contains an 
empirical analysis of the stabilizing properties of the gold standard and Bret- 
ton Woods rules. Section 2.5 offers a few concluding remarks. 
2.1  Elements of a Theory of Exchange-Rate Regimes as Rules and 
Discretion 
In the debate on monetary policy, the idea that fixed rules might improve 
the performance of monetary institutions has been a recurrent one. The earli- 
est proponents of the superiority of rules were the members of the so-called 
currency school, opposing the banking school in the debate on the statute of 
the Bank of England. In the first half of the twentieth century, the superiority 
of  rules was most prominently  claimed by  the Cunliffe Committee  ([1918] 
1985) and Simons (19361.’ The same idea has spurred a large amount of aca- 
demic research on monetary policy in the last fifteen years, after the work of 
Kydland  and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), Fischer (1980), and Barro and 
Gordon (1983),  and has been exploited in the very recent discussions of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and of exchange-rate policies of European 
countries outside the European Community. Several European policymakers, 
both within and outside the EMS, have claimed that, rather than making the 
job of monetary authorities harder, the “discipline” associated with a fixed- 
exchange-rate system could actually help them fight inflation more effectively. 
In this section, I explore an application to the rules-versus-discretion theory 
of monetary policy to the history of international monetary regimes. The basic 
hypothesis is that, if monetary policy rules are, under some conditions, pre- 
ferred over discretion, countries would have a tendency to use them to con- 
strain monetary authorities. 
I do not present a formal model of the advantages of monetary policy rules 
1. Sirnons claimed that a set of rules for monetary policy is the hallmark of a liberal system, 
while discretion, i.e., active management of the currency, “along with protectionism, is the pro- 
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for two reasons. First, to add significantly to the existing literature,2 a model 
of  monetary  policy  rules needs  some detail on  the monetary  transmission 
mechanism, which in the past one hundred years has arguably adapted to tech- 
nical progress and regulatory changes in financial markets and to changes in 
wage contracting and pricing practices. Studying the effects of monetary pol- 
icy  and  the  adjustment  mechanism  during  the  gold  standard  and  Bretton 
Woods is beyond the scope of this paper.3 I will also not refer to a specific 
model of  the monetary transmission mechanism in order to highlight the gen- 
erality of the central results of the rules-versus-discretion literature. 
1.  Monetary authorities’ objectives do not coincide with the equilibrium at 
2.  Monetary policies’ effects on the economy depend on the extent to which 
3. The public forms expectations rationally. 
Two typical  illustrations of  assumption  1 are (i) the case of  imperfectly 
competitive trade unions and/or price setters and (ii) the case of  inflationary 
financing of budget deficits. In case (i), monetary authorities want to manip- 
ulate prices and exchange rates so as to affect the level of output (with monop- 
olistic price and wage setters the level of output is “too low”). In case (ii), 
monetary  authorities  want to finance budget  deficits at a minimum cost in 
terms of  distortions. A third illustration, close to the second one, is that of 
monetary authorities attempting to lower the real interest rate to ease the cost 
of financing budget deficits. 
Assumption 2 means that, if the public can correctly anticipate policy ac- 
tions, it will try to minimize any undesirable effects of them (see assumption 
1  on the conflict between  the monetary  authority and the public) by  taking 
actions  to neutralize them.  Assumption 3 means  that  monetary  authorities 
cannot manipulate private expectations. 
The implication of  assumptions 1-3  is that, in economies where monetary 
authorities are not subject to rules explicitly designed to prevent them from 
creating inflation, the equilibrium is one where the attempts of the authorities 
to surprise the public are frustrated by the public’s anticipation of such behav- 
ior: inflation is higher, and expansionary monetary policies are neutralized. 
What is the value of monetary rules? If  such rules are credible, in the sense 
that the government cannot renege on them,  the public forms expectations 
assuming that the rules are followed. To the extent that monetary rules are 
sufficiently  restraining,  the  public’s  inflationary  expectations  will  be 
stemmed, and therefore equilibrium inflation will be lower than under a dis- 
cretionary regime. Since under discretion the government expansionary inten- 
The basic assumptions are three: 
which the economy tends to settle. 
they surprise the public. 
2. See, in particular, the surveys in Persson and Tabellini (1991) and Canzoneri and Henderson 
3. On adjustment during Bretton Woods, see Obstfeld (chap. 4 in this volume). 
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tions are neutralized, equilibrium under rules is preferred to equilibrium under 
discretion as long as inflation is perceived to be costly. Thus, credible mone- 
tary rules are effective because they stabilize expectations. 
Having established the desirability of rules as a means of stabilizing expec- 
tations, we need to determine how the idea can be applied to the interpretation 
of the history of exchange-rate regimes and in particular of the periodic aban- 
donment of and return to fixed exchange rates. Assume, for a moment, that a 
regime of fixed exchange rates is a monetary rule while a regime of  floating 
rates is discretion (I go back to these assumptions below). How can a sequence 
of rules and discretion be endogenously chosen by monetary authorities and 
hence be the equilibrium  outcome of the interaction between monetary au- 
thorities and the public? We  know that monetary authorities always have an 
incentive to abandon rules. This incentive can be stronger in situations where 
sticking to the rules is very costly (because, e.g., of a negative supply shock 
or because of unanticipated jumps in budget deficits).  Indeed,  one can find 
states of the world-which  we can call “exceptional circumstances”-where 
the abandonment of rules would be desired both by the monetary authorities 
and by the public. A sequence of rules and discretion would hence be possible 
if  rules are abandoned only under exceptional circumstances,  which can be 
unambiguously identified both by monetary authorities and by the public, and 
are reinstated whenever the reasons for the suspension are gone, or at any rate 
after a reasonably predictable length of time. 
A  model  of  contingent  monetary  rules is  presented  in  Flood  and  Isard 
(1989a, 1989b, 1990).4  The basic idea of this model is that combining a rule 
with discretion makes the discretionary policy more effective when it is used. 
A rule with an escape clause might be preferred to a simple rule whenever the 
costs of sticking to the rule are large: as Persson and Tabellini (1991) show, 
this happens, for example, when the exogenous shocks to which the monetary 
authority has an incentive to react are highly volatile. 
Applications  of  escape  clause  models  to exchange-rate  regimes  are pro- 
vided  by  de Kock and  Grilli  (1989)  and Bordo  and  Kydland  (1990).  The 
model by de Kock and Grilli is the first formal application of the escape clause 
idea to the history of exchange-rate regimes. These authors consider a small 
economy’s choice among a fixed exchange rate (the rule), an adjustment of 
the fixed exchange rate (the escape), and a floating exchange rate. They ex- 
plore the conditions under which a combination of rules and discretion (which 
requires a known value of the exogenous shock beyond which the authority 
exercises discretion) is an equilibrium: the monetary authority has no incen- 
tives to renege on it, and the public believes the monetary a~thority.~  Bordo 
4. For an illustration and a discussion of these models, see also Persson and Tabellini (1991) as 
well as Lohmann (1990) and Flood and Isard (1990). Grossman and Van Huick (1988) exploit the 
same idea in an  analysis of government debt repudiation. 
5. In  de Kock and Grilli (1989), the public punishes the authority that adopts a discretionary 
strategy even under “normal” realizations of the exogenous shock by  reverting to floating ex- 
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and Kydland (1990) discuss the experience with the gold standard in terms of 
a model of rules with contingencies or escape clauses. They consider two 
kinds of contingencies: wars and financial crises. 
The attempt to use an escape clause model to explain the evolution of inter- 
national monetary regimes raises a number of questions, which are not fully 
answered by  the authors cited above, who concentrate on issues that overlap 
only partially with the one addressed in this paper. First of all, can a fixed- 
exchange-rate system that does not rely on any explicit nominal anchor be 
likened to a monetary rule? The obvious difference between a commodity 
standard (i.e., a fixed-exchange-rate system with a nominal anchor) like the 
gold standard and a fixed-exchange-rate regime under a fiat currency system 
is that, in the latter regime, there is nothing preventing participating monetary 
authorities to generate inflation arbitrarily, as long as they do so in a coordi- 
nated fashion, to preserve the fixed parities. This is just an illustration of the 
well-known “n - 1” problem: given n currencies, there are n - 1 indepen- 
dent bilateral exchange rates.  Maintaining these n - 1 bilateral fixed ex- 
change rates ties down as many national money stocks. Hence, there is one 
degree of  freedom left. In the absence of exogenous rules, the price level is 
arbitrarily determined by the remaining nth country. 
It could be  claimed that,  in practice,  it is difficult to generate inflation 
through internationally coordinated monetary surprises and, therefore, that a 
fixed-rate regime is in general a powerful enough rule even in the absence of 
a commodity standard. Even accepting this claim, one would have to prove 
that a fixed-exchange-rate regime has built-in features that discourage world- 
wide inflation. For example, it can be argued that a fixed-exchange-rate sys- 
tem has a deflationary bias caused by liquidity constraints facing central bank- 
ers who try to finance balance-of-payments deficits. This view could provide 
a  base  for  the  hypothesis  that,  even  in  a  fiat  currency  system,  a  fixed- 
exchange-rate regime is a satisfactory rule for monetary authorities. Thus, a 
candidate model of fixed exchange rates as monetary rules (a model of inter- 
national monetary rules) relies on the proposition that fixed exchange rates 
have built-in incentives toward monetary restraint, arising from the difficulties 
of financing balance-of-payments deficits. 
An alternative candidate is the model of imported credibility. Under a fiat 
monetary system, an independent central bank managed by a “conservative” 
governor (Rogoff 1985) achieves outcomes similar to those of  a commodity 
standard because an independent and conservative central banker is “exoge- 
nous,” like the convertibility rule of  a commodity standard. The tenure and 
the behavior of the conservative central banker cannot be affected by the pref- 
erences of  either the public or the fiscal authorities. The imported credibility 
model relies on the proposition that,  by  pegging the value of  the national 
money to a currency managed by a conservative central banker, a country will 
import that banker’s credibility and reap the benefits highlighted by the rules- 
versus-discretion literature (see Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). 
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the fixed exchange rate is more credible than other policies.  Why should a 
policy of pegging the currency to a low-inflation country be more believable 
than a policy of maintaining a low growth rate for the domestic money stock 
under a regime of floating exchange rates? To my knowledge, no general an- 
swers to this question have been offered so far. One notable feature of fixed 
exchange rates is that the price of a reference foreign currency  is a highly 
visible, and unambiguous,  target. Canzoneri (1985) shows that, if the mone- 
tary authority has private information about, say, velocity shocks, it can lead 
the public to believe  that it acts conservatively even when  it  does not.  The 
strategies described by Canzoneri would not be possible under fixed exchange 
rates because, under such a regime, the monetary authority automatically ac- 
commodates velocity shocks. In general, it is easy to monitor compliance to a 
fixed-exchange-rate rule, and, for that reason, the losses from suspending the 
rule might be  larger  (since the  public  knows exactly when  the rule is sus- 
pended). 
In sum, the answer to the first question-whether  a fixed-exchange-rate 
system under a fiat currency regime is a monetary rule-is  yes only under two 
rather strong conditions: that the exchange rate is a more credible target than 
any other monetary target and that the international system has built-in  fea- 
tures that discourage global inflation (penalties for deficit countries or inde- 
pendent and conservative central bankers). 
We  can ask a second question about the application of  the escape clause 
model to the history of the international monetary system. Can floating rates 
be regarded as a temporary  suspension of the rules? It could be argued, for 
example, that exceptional  circumstances  call only for an adjustment of  the 
exchange-rate peg, as in de Kock and Grilli, but not for a reversal to float- 
ing exchange rates. Alternatively, as Bordo and Kydland suggest, suspensions 
of convertibility during financial crises are consistent with the escape clause 
model. While this may well be true, its verification is beyond the objective of 
this paper, which seeks to determine whether the more important and longer- 
term regime shifts can be explained by the model of rules with escape clauses. 
Analytically, it should be possible to build a model where discretion is ex- 
ercised over a known period of time. Bordo and Kydland stress, however, that 
the length of this period should be known. In a more complicated setting, the 
time of  return  to fixed rates  could be  a nonstochastic function of  available 
information.  Hence, the  answer to the  second  question-whether  floating 
rates can be regarded as a temporary suspension of the rules-is  again yes if 
the public can form reasonable expectations that fixed rates will be reinstated 
when a set of objective and known conditions are met. Thus, while in theory 
it is possible to accommodate temporary reversals to floating rates, a historical 
assessment of this model requires a careful analysis of returns to fixed rates. 
To  be consistent with the model, returns to fixed rates have to be easily fore- 
casted and have to be motivated by the desire to reinstate monetary rules. 
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that could be used to interpret the historical evolution of  exchange-rate re- 
gimes. However, as I stressed in this section, there are also conceptual prob- 
lems with this exercise. The international gold standard system was one where 
national convertibility rules were automatically made consistent by the work- 
ing of international financial markets. Under a fiat currency system, by con- 
trast, it is not immediately apparent that a regime of fixed exchange rates can 
qualify as a monetary rule. If it does, under the conditions spelled out above, 
it is a very special kind of rule, purely international. 
In the sections that follow, I will try to provide evidence useful in verifying 
the model. The exercise combines a discussion of  the historical record with 
statistical work. Using the historical record, I will ask whether convertibility 
rules that characterize the gold standard were visible enough-a  necessary 
condition to be credible-and  whether the return to gold in the interwar years 
was regarded as a return to normalcy. I next examine in detail the setup of the 
Bretton Woods system, to determine whether in the minds of its builders such 
a system had to commit monetary authorities to price stability. The statistical 
analysis will discuss some evidence on the credibility of the gold points and 
of the fluctuation bands under the gold standard and Bretton Woods, respec- 
tively. 
2.2  The Importance of Rules in the Experience of the Classical Gold 
Standard and the Return to Gold in the Interwar Period 
In the classical gold standard, international monetary rules were not codi- 
fied by an international government agency but were the implication of  con- 
vertibility rules embedded in national regulations, like central bank statutes. 
While gold provided the external numeraire (or nominal anchor) to both the 
gold standard and the Bretton Woods regime, under the former central banks 
were obliged to intervene in the gold market to support the parity: they were 
ready to exchange domestic banknotes for gold coins at a specified official 
value, the mint par. By contrast, under Bretton Woods central banks were not 
obliged to intervene in the gold market. In addition, under the gold standard 
central bank statutes fixed or regulated the ratio between gold reserves and 
note circulation. 
The ease of  official gold convertibility in different countries is the subject 
of historical debate. The general agreement is that convertibility was easiest 
at the Bank of England, while in several instances certain Continental central 
banks, like the Reichsbank and the Banque de France, discouraged “internal” 
and “external” drains of gold reserves (see Bloomfield 1959). 
Another noticeable difference between the classical gold standard and the 
Bretton Woods system is the existence of a network of financial facilities for 
balance-of-payments financing. No official arrangements were in place under 
the gold standard, yet Ford (1962) and Kindleberger (1984) report a number 
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European central banks helped stem speculative pressures.6 By contrast, the 
IMF Articles  of Agreement  (discussed  in more detail in  sec. 2.3.3 below) 
provide a complex system of facilities for the purpose of balance-of-payments 
financing. 
Despite the absence of international monetary institutions,  the gold stan- 
dard  rule was extremely  visible: a necessary  condition to be  credible.  The 
visibility of the gold standard rule was accompanied by public awareness on 
the value of commitment, especially in Britain. As Scammell’s (1965) author- 
itative description of the classical gold standard succinctly puts it, “The Bank 
[of England] regarded the maintenance of the convertibility of sterling to gold 
as paramount and any sustained gold movement always led to action sooner 
or later.” 
The extent to which policymakers  and their advisers valued commitment 
can be gauged from an analysis of the debates preceding the reestablishment 
of  the gold standard in the interwar years. The Cunliffe Committee ([1918] 
1985) strongly advocated the return to the gold standard rule to induce stabil- 
ity in financial markets: “Nothing  can contribute more to a speedy recovery 
from the effects of the war, and to the rehabilitation of the foreign exchanges, 
than the re-establishment of the currency upon a sound basis.” 
The return to the gold standard was discussed at the  1920 Brussels confer- 
ence and at the Genoa conference in 1922 (see Eichengreen 1992). The Com- 
mittee on Currency and Exchange of the Brussels conference did not mention 
gold explicitly. However, it advocated the elimination of  exchange controls, 
the restoration of central bank independence, and the establishment of a corn- 
mon standard of value on which to base the new monetary system. 
At the Genoa conference, it was acknowledged that a return  to gold at a 
parity different from that of the prewar period would undermine the credibility 
of  monetary authorities by reminding investors of  the authorities’ control of 
gold parities. The delegates from France, Belgium, and Italy were the strong- 
est endorsers of the principle of the return to the prewar parity, yet, as Eichen- 
green (1992) notes, the very same countries did not follow that principle a few 
years later. 
Britain’s resumption of the prewar parity, announced by Churchill in April 
1925, is traditionally regarded as the best evidence of that country’s commit- 
ment to the gold standard rule. Soon afterward, that decision was widely re- 
garded  as an  error,  which  cost  Britain  and  other  countries  a  great  deal. 
Whether the economic disruptions of the  1930s were caused by Britain’s de- 
cision alone or by the policies that followed it but were not necessarily caused 
by it remains an open question.’ 
As Bordo and Kydland (1990) suggest, the experience of the gold standard 
and of its return after World War I is prima facie evidence in favor of the model 
6.  Eichengreen (1992) also emphasizes the importance of these swap facilities. However, these 
7. For a discussion, see Eichengreen (1992). 
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of rules with escape clauses. There is, however, disagreement with this inter- 
pretation of the facts. For example, Temin (1991, 8) maintains that industrial 
countries resumed the gold standard because they considered it the “normal” 
way to run the world monetary  system, not necessarily  because of  their es- 
teem of the discipline that characterizes a commodity standard. I do not at- 
tempt to resolve this controversy here but concentrate instead on the second 
resumption of fixed rates, the Bretton Woods regime. 
2.3  The Importance of Rules in the Design of 
Bretton Woods Institutions 
The international monetary institutions of the second postwar period are the 
outcome of the negotiations between the United States and Britaim8 The ob- 
jective  of  this  section  is to determine whether the builders  of  the  Bretton 
Woods regime believed that a credible commitment of monetary authorities to 
price stability should be a crucial feature of the new monetary ~ystem.~ 
In  1943, the British and U.S.  Treasuries published two plans for interna- 
tional  monetary  reform,  whose  principal  drafters  were,  respectively,  John 
Maynard Keynes and Harry D. White. Both plans were characterized by an 
institution-the  International Clearing Union in the British document and the 
International Stabilization Fund in the U.S. document-whose  purposes were 
to help multilateral balance-of-payments  financing, to economize in interna- 
tional means of payments,  and to ensure a degree of exchange-rate stability. 
In the discussion below, I leave aside the (substantial) parts of  the two plans 
describing the mechanics of the international monetary institution except in- 
sofar as they relate to the question of the international monetary rule. 
2.3.1  The British Plan 
The objectives of the British plan, some of which are reported below, high- 
light the concerns of British policymakers: 
We need an instrument of international currency having general acceptabil- 
ity between nations.  . . . 
We need an orderly and agreed method of determining the relative exchange 
values of  national currency units,  so that unilateral action and competitive 
exchange depreciations are prevented. 
8. Despite the fact that the countries participating in the Bretton Woods conference-the  so- 
called United Nations-were  forty-four in number. 
9. For a discussion of the US.-British negotiations preceding the 1943 proposals, see in partic- 
ular Gardner (1969). The relevant episode is the Atlantic conference of  1941, during which the 
general  U.S.  stance-multilateralism  and nondiscrimination-was  adopted by  Britain.  At the 
same time, the Lend-Lease program became law and allowed the U.S. president discretion in 
assisting any country, but especially Britain, whose defense was considered vital to the United 
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We need a quantum of international currency, which is neither determined 
in an unpredictable and irrelevant manner as, for example, by the technical 
progress in the gold industry, nor subject to large variations depending on 
the gold reserve policies of individual countries.  . . . 
We need a system . . . whereby pressure is exercised on any country whose 
balance of payments with the rest of the world is departing from equilib- 
rium in either direction. . . . 
More generally,  we need a means of reassurance to a troubled world,  by 
which any country whose own affairs are conducted with due prudence is 
relieved of anxiety, for causes which are not due of  its own making, con- 
cerning its ability to meet its international liabilities; and which will, there- 
fore,  make  unnecessary  those  methods  of  restriction  and  discrimination 
which  countries  have  adopted  hitherto.  (British  Information  Services 
1943a, 5) 
It seems clear that the establishment of a monetary rule whose aim is to 
discourage  inflationary policies  was not  a declared  intention  of  the  British 
proposal.  Indeed, the British document states plainly, “The plan aims at the 
substitution  of  expansionist,  in  place  of  contractionist,  pressure  on  world 
trade” (British Information Services 1943a, 12), implying a belief that mone- 
tary policy can be consistently employed to stimulate international trade and 
economic expansion. 
In the view of the British Treasury, gold remained a standard of monetary 
value because it “still possesses great psychological value which is not being 
diminished by current events; and the desire to possess a gold reserve against 
unforeseen contingencies is likely to remain. Gold also has the merit of pro- 
viding in point of form (whatever the underlying realities might be) an uncon- 
troversial standard of value for international purposes, for which it would not 
yet be easy to find a serviceable substitute.” The British government suggested 
the introduction  of  an international currency  for intergovernmental transac- 
tions, the bancor, to be defined in terms of a weight of gold. The value of the 
bancor in terms of gold was not, however, to be unalterably  fixed. Further- 
more, “What, in the long run, the world may decide to do with gold is another 
matter” (British Information Services 1943a, 16). 
The quotations given above summarize well the position of the British gov- 
ernment. Gold is regarded as a necessary element of the new world monetary 
order because of its heritage, but not because any value is attached to it as a 
rule for the conduct of monetary policy. The reference to the “great psycho- 
logical value” of gold suggests an awareness of the importance of credibility 
in a monetary system, but the rest of the document seems to imply that gold 
should not be sought as a mechanism to ensure such credibility. Indeed, both 
the possibility of changing the dollar value of the bancor, without any explic- 
itly stated formal constraint, and the implicit allowance of a complete phasing 
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the question of providing a worldwide anchor for monetary policy. Rather, the 
British proposal’s central concern was adjustment and symmetry: see in par- 
ticular its position on capital  and the provision of charging interest 
on the negative clearing positions while at the same time taxing the creditor 
balances. 
More important, changes in parities (defined in terms of  bancor) did not 
require consultation and were allowed whenever a criterion for unsustainabil- 
ity of external imbalances was met. The lack of concern with nominal anchors 
is confirmed by the following statement of  the chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Sir Kingsley Wood: “On the face of  it, the [U.S. Treasury’s] scheme appears 
to relate exchanges and balances more closely to gold than does the clearing 
union” (British Information Services 1943b, 13). 
In sum, the British proposal is based on the view that the international mon- 
etary system should not constitute a hindrance to expansionist monetary poli- 
cies and that monetary policies should not be used by individual countries to 
gain advantage from their neighbors (hence the call for exchange-rate stabil- 
ity): all this seems quite far from the rule-based view of international mone- 
tary systems. The British position was probably motivated by two major con- 
cerns:  avoiding  the  troubles  of  the  interwar  years  and  providing  a  world 
environment that would help Britain ease out of its war debts. 
The records circulated by the British Information Services (1943b) do not 
contain any criticism of the Keynes plan from the House of Commons and the 
House  of  Lords.  Perhaps  because  of  the powerful  intellectual  influence  of 
Keynes, the British government and Parliament not only were not advocating 
the imposition of rules in the world monetary order but openly declared their 
aversion to them. Their mistrust of the equilibrating forces of the international 
monetary  system”  implied the belief  that interventionist  monetary policies 
were necessary to ensure the proper support of economic activity. These inter- 
ventionist  policies,  as Meltzer (1988) stresses, were in Keynes’s view to be 
subject to rules, which, however, were not simple and were not designed with 
the sole purpose of limiting incentives to inflate. 
10. “It is widely held that control of capital movement, both inward and outward, should be a 
permanent feature of the postwar system” (British Information Services 1943a, 17, par. 33). 
11. Keynes wrote to Richard Kahn in August 1941, “In the past five hundred years there have 
been only two periods of about fifty years each (the ages of Elizabeth and Victoria in English 
chronology) when the use of money for the conduct of international trade can be said to have 
‘worked’,-first  whilst the prodigious augmentation of the supply of silver from the new world 
was substituting the features of inflation for those of deflation (bringing a different sort of evil with 
it), and again in the second half of  the nineteenth century when (for reasons to be developed 
below) the system of international investment pivoting on London transferred the onus of adjust- 
ment from the debtor to the creditor position. 
“To  suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment 
which preserves equilibrium if only we trust to methods of laissez-faire is a doctrinaire delusion 
which disregards the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support of sound 
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2.3.2  The U.S.  Plan 
Similarly to those of Britain, the objectives of the U.S.  plan do not mention 
the importance of rules in the new international monetary system. They are as 
follows (adapted from U.S. Treasury 1943): 
To help stabilize the foreign exchange rates of the currencies of the United 
Nations.  . . . 
To shorten the periods and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the inter- 
national balance of payments of member countries. 
To help create conditions under which the smooth flow of foreign trade and 
of productive capital among member countries will be fostered. 
To facilitate the effective utilization of blocked foreign balances accumulat- 
ing in some countries as a consequence of the war situation. 
To reduce the use of foreign exchange restrictions. 
The first two items grow from an interpretation  of the interwar experience 
similar  to  that  of  the  British:  countries  should  not  use  exchange  rates  as 
beggar-thy-neighbor  devices,  and  the  international  adjustment  mechanism 
needs the intervention of governments. The last three, loosely inspired by the 
postwar  U.S.  philosophy  based  on  multilateralism  and  nondiscrimination, 
mainly regard the postwar reconstruction. 
Despite the lack of  mention of  monetary restraint in its objectives, the U.S. 
Treasury proposal (1943) had  strict rules on the linkage of the international 
currency, the unitus, with gold. According to the White plan, the unitas value 
was fixed in gold (137% grains of fine gold). Furthermore, 
No change in the  gold value of the unitus shall be made except with the 
approval of  85 percent of the member votes.  . . . 
The value of  the currency of each member country shall be established in 
terms of  unitus and may  not  be  altered except  . . . with  the  approval of 
three-fourths of the member votes including the representative of  the coun- 
try concerned. 
These changes would not be considered unless they were essential to the cor- 
rection of fundamental disequilibrium in the balance of payments of the coun- 
try in question.I2 
The British Parliament was critical of the White plan, whose stress on fix- 
ing the gold content of currencies and on liberalizing world financial marketst3 
they regarded  as “the very things that smashed the world economic system 
which prevailed before the war” (British Information Services 1943b, 40).14 
12. The plan adds two transitional provisions, for the immediate postwar period, meant to make 
the procedure of exchange-rate  adjustments less restrictive,  with a view that equilibrium rates 
might be harder to determine immediately at the end of World War 11. 
13. In his presentation to the House of Lords, Keynes suggested that this is in fact a misreading 
of the White plan, which advocated liberalization of only current transactions. 
14. In his statement to the House of Commons, Bob Boothby said, “We can never go back to 
the gold standard . . . we can never tolerate any outside interference with our inalienable right to 
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Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the two plans faced significant oppo- 
sition at home. The best known critic of the plans is John Williams (see Wil- 
liams  1943). Williams’s  strong prior is that the success of  the international 
gold standard was due to the stability of its center country, Britain-hence  his 
suggestion that the post-World  War  I1 system also rely on center countries 
(which, in his view, should be more than one). However, these center coun- 
tries can guarantee  a smooth functioning  of  the  world  system only if  they 
cooperate in monetary affairs much more closely than was envisaged by the 
Bretton Woods charter. 
The most interesting critique that I was able to find comes from Benjamin 
Anderson, a professor of economics at the University of California, Los An- 
geles. Anderson’s  position appears to be very close to the “rules” theory of 
international monetary regimes: 
Fixed rates in the foreign exchanges are eminently desirable. A temperature 
of 98.6 in the human body is eminently desirable, but a rigging of the ther- 
mometer so that it will always record 98.6 regardless of the fluctuations in 
the temperature of  a sick patient is a rather futile performance. And a rig- 
ging of  the foreign exchange markets so that they  will record  fixed rates 
among sound and unsound countries, regardless of  a deterioration of the 
fundamentals governing the values of the moneys of the unsound countries, 
merely masks the facts of financial disease and disorder, and defers the time 
when these fundamentals must be dealt with. (Anderson 1944, 10) 
Yet  the reason why Anderson values international monetary restraint is, to- 
gether  with  a general  aversion to inflation-as  in the models discussed in 
section 2.1 above-a  very concrete concern that the new monetary system 
would allow debtor countries, and in particular Britain, to default on their war 
debts surreptitiously.  Anderson envisaged Britain  exploiting the multilateral 
clearing system it proposed by paying for its imports and servicing  its debt 
from the United States, not in “good  dollars” or “still pretty good sterling,” 
but  in  the currencies of  the  countries  of  its  exports:  “the  bad  francs, lire, 
marks, Greek drachmae, etc.” The implicit assumption in this reasoning is, of 
course, that the real purchasing power of the “bad” currencies could not be 
ensured by the system of bancor or unitas parities and by the linkage of these 
latter units of account with gold. In other words, Anderson saw the fixed-rates 
regime as transforming itself into a regime of competitive inflation, caused by 
institutions that he regarded as the most suitable to export the inflation tax. 
2.3.3 
The IMF Articles of Agreement contain elements of both the British and 
the U.S. proposals.  In many ways, the Articles further departed from the at- 
tempts to restore free capital movements and rules of conduct for monetary 
policy that appeared in the U.S. proposal. 
The objectives of  the IMF,  spelled out in Article I, include international 
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cooperation  in  monetary  matters, high  employment  (through the expansion 
and balanced  growth of international trade), exchange-rate stability, a multi- 
lateral payments system, and balance-of-payments financing and adjustment. 
As in the case of the two proposals, no direct mention is made of either price 
stability or free trade in financial assets. 
The provisions regarding the nominal anchor are contained in Article IV. 
All member countries are required to express a central parity of their curren- 
cies, either in terms of gold or in terms of dollars “of the weight and fineness 
in effect on July 1, 1944.” Maximum-fluctuation bands are also established at 
1 percent in either direction.I5 The article also discusses changes in par values. 
Countries  can change exchange parities after consultations  with  the  Fund, 
given  the need  to correct  a “fundamental  disequilibrium.”  I6  The Fund will 
concur with the proposed change if it is satisfied that it can correct the funda- 
mental disequilibrium.  If the Fund does not concur and the parity is changed 
nevertheless,  the country becomes  ineligible for Fund resources,  unless the 
Fund determines otherwise. 
Article IV represents  a significant deviation from the White plan,  which 
required a majority of the board in order to grant a change in the parity of any 
member currency. The mechanism of approval from the IMF is meant to safe- 
guard  the  international  monetary  system  from  competitive  exchange-rate 
changes, but it is substantially less restrictive than the original U.S. proposal. 
Article VI deals with capital flight. It says that a country facing sustained 
capital outflows does not have access to Fund resources to finance the result- 
ing balance-of-payments problems. The Fund may require that country to im- 
pose capital controls in order to avoid reserve losses.  The article explicitly 
allows controls on capital movements that are not linked with the financing of 
international trade. 
Finally, Article VII, on scarce currencies, describes measures to replenish 
the Fund’s holdings as well as emergency measures to ration the scarce cur- 
rency.  No  mention  is made in  the  article of  the  fundamental  problem that 
might give rise to the phenomenon of  a scarce currency, divergent monetary 
policies,  and of  ways to correct the origins of the problem. In other words, 
monetary policy coordination (which under fixed rates amounts to the coordi- 
nation of  domestic credit policies) is induced indirectly, through the various 
alarm bells set up by the Fund. However, it is never mentioned or encouraged 
explicitly. The Articles of Agreement attempt to substitute a novel concept, 
monetary policy coordination,  for the fixed, exogenous gold standard rules. 
However, its official status is far below that of the convertibility rules of  the 
gold standard: for this reason, this substitution seems to be incomplete and 
not sufficiently effective. 
15. Article IV does not explicitly say whether these bands apply only to the dollar exchange 
16. Exchange-rate realignments below 10 percent do not need the Fund’s approval. 
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Further light on the question of the importance of rules in the minds of the 
builders of the Bretton Woods system can be obtained from the replies of U.S. 
officials to various critics. Edwin Kemmerer (1945) echoed several of the con- 
cerns of  Benjamin Anderson. He pointed to the ineffectiveness of  the safe- 
guards against changes in currency parities, noting that any country is free to 
generate “fundamental disequilibria” on its own by  pursuing  expansionary 
monetary policies in support of budget laxity. To  this and other similar criti- 
cism, Harry White responded,  “Englishmen  have not forgotten that in the 
sterling crisis of  1931 social services were cut in the attempt to maintain the 
fixed sterling parity. To use international  monetary arrangements as a cloak 
for the enforcement of unpopular policies whose merits or demerits rest not 
on international monetary considerations as such but on the whole economic 
program and philosophy  of the country concerned, would poison the atmo- 
sphere of international financial stability” (White 1945, 8). 
White’s thinking, which well represents the opinion of experts and policy- 
makers responsible for the Bretton Woods system, is clearly very far from the 
Cunliffe Report philosophy. His response to the Bretton Woods critics is that 
international monetary rules cannot be used as scapegoats for unpopular do- 
mestic policies. For this reason, monetary rules have been studiously mini- 
mized in the IMF charter. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the IMF charter and what went into it sug- 
gests that the establishment of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange 
rates cannot be viewed as the return to a monetary rule in the sense specified 
in section 2.1 above. The discussion there stressed that a fixed-rate regime can 
be considered a monetary rule under one of two conditions: 
1. It is based on a convertibility rule that implies a set of bilateral exchange 
rates and provides a nominal anchor. 
2.  It is centered around an independent and conservative monetary authority 
or has some other feature discouraging any country from pursuing expan- 
sionist monetary policies.  In this setup, however, exchange-rate parities 
need to be credible, that is, costly to change. 
The concept of  an independent conservative monetary authority is absent 
from  the Articles of  Agreement,  and  so are “private” convertibility  rules. 
While the price of gold maintained an important role of reference, countries 
were  not  heavily  constrained  in  changing their  own  gold  parities  through 
changes in dollar parities. As historical experience demonstrated (see, in par- 
ticular, Houthakker 1978), such constraints appeared more binding in the case 
of the United States, although-as  Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) stress- 
this could simply be a reflection of the asymmetry of the Bretton Woods re- 
gime. 124  Albert0 Giovannini 
2.4  Empirical Evidence on the Credibility of the Gold Standard 
and Bretton Woods Rules 
In section 2.1, I argued that the main implication of the models proving the 
superiority of  monetary rules over discretion is that such rules help stabilize 
expectations.  In this section, I complement the discussion of  the theory and 
of the historical record  with empirical evidence.  This evidence is meant  to 
illustrate the behavior of  expectations during the gold  standard and Bretton 
Woods. 
The strategy is to study prices in those markets where monetary authorities 
should have followed the rules, to derive estimates of private expectations, 
and to determine whether, and in what direction, such expectations were sig- 
nificantly affected by the monetary rules.  The literature on the “rules of the 
game” discussing central bank policies under the gold standard-sometimes 
extended to fixed exchange rates in general-often  mentions “rules” of be- 
havior for central banks that are supposedly required to make the gold stan- 
dard work. The rules of the game should not be confused with the rules stud- 
ied here. The rules of the game are policies meant to assure that the central 
banks will  not generate too large gold outflows or inflows, thus permitting 
gold convertibility both at home and abroad. They are arbitrary, in the sense 
that they rely on assumptions about the effects of central bank operations on 
financial markets and gold flows.  By contrast, the monetary rules discussed 
here are specific actions that central banks were required to take (like convert- 
ibility of banknotes into gold at a given official price), which were often cod- 
ified by laws and well known to all market participants. 
The markets where authorities should have followed monetary rules are the 
financial markets, the gold market during the gold standard, and the foreign 
exchange market during the Bretton Woods regime. In addition to being more 
focused, an analysis of financial markets has two other advantages over an 
analysis based on the study of inflation and output performances: it does not 
require assumptions about the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of 
the economy and can rely on better-quality data. 
The basic exercise carried out below is as follows. The gold standard and 
Bretton Woods rules imply a range within which exchange rates are supposed 
to fluctuate.  From interest rates and forward exchange rates it is possible to 
derive estimates of  expectations of exchange-rate changes. Below, I will try 
to determine whether exchange-rate expectations were (i) consistent with the 
parities implied by the international rules and (ii) affected by those rules, and 
in what direction. 
I consider samples from the classical gold standard period and the Bretton 
Woods years. The interwar gold standard is not included because the extreme 
political instability and economic fluctuations of the interwar years have likely 
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added substantial volatility in financial markets, thus complicating the inter- 
pretation of the evidence. 
2.4.1  The Data 
Foreign Exchange Markets and Fluctuation Bands during the Gold Standard 
Foreign exchange rates during the gold standard were stabilized by  gold. 
Private citizens could convert national currencies into gold, and vice versa, in 
transactions with  national monetary authorities. Gold parities of  individual 
national currencies implied bilateral exchange rates. 
However, since arbitrage between the gold market and the foreign exchange 
market was costly, the bilateral exchange rates implied by  the gold parities 
were not enough to tie down foreign exchanges in the financial markets. Ex- 
change rates could fluctuate within a band whose size was determined by the 
costs of  arbitrage between financial markets and the gold market. This band 
well exceeded the buying and selling points for gold used by central banks. 
How did such arbitrage take place? Suppose, for example, that the dollar 
price of  sterling in financial markets is less than the dollar price of  sterling 
implied by the gold parity. The arbitrage consists in buying sterling for dollars 
in  the financial market and selling sterling for dollars through the monetary 
authorities. Hence,  sterling should be  brought to the Bank of  England for 
conversion into gold, gold should be shipped to the United States, and dollars 
should be bought from the U.S. Treasury in exchange for gold. 
Since, however, these operations take time, a proper account of the costs of 
the transactions should reflect the interest cost represented by the shipment of 
gold. Figure 2.1 shows a diagram of the transactions involved in the arbitrage. 
Figure 2.la describes the case of  the export of  gold from England to the 
United States. At time 0, dollars are borrowed to purchase sterling in the spot 
foreign exchange market. Gold is bought from the Bank of  England and is 
shipped to the United States. When gold arrives at time 1, it is sold to the U.S. 
Treasury, and the proceeds are used, in part, to repay the dollar loan. Figure 
2. lb  describes arbitrage involving imports of gold into England. The sterling 
proceeds of  the gold sale are sold in the forward exchange market, at a price 
fixed at time 0. Hence, the transactions in figure 2.1 all occur at prices known 
to the arbitrageur at time 0. The purchases of sterling and dollars necessary to 
start the operations could be financed with an alternative set of transactions, 
which are easy to figure out using the diagrams. To  the extent that covered 
interest parity holds, the cost of these alternative transactions is approximately 
equal to the cost of the transactions reported in the figure. 
In the case of  the dollar-sterling exchange, monthly gold points are com- 
puted  following Clark (1984) and  Officer (1986), over the period January 
1889-December  1908. The cost of  shipping gold is broken down into the 
interest cost (borrowing money to buy gold) or the opportunity cost (forgone 
interest during the voyage) and the direct costs (freight, insurance, packing, 126  Albert0 Giovannini 
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the United States. b, Export of gold from the United States to Britain. 
Scheme of arbitrage transactions. a, Export of gold from Britain to 
minting, and abrasion).  Whenever the spot exchange rate (dollar per pound) 
is lower than the official exchange rate discounted by the cost, it is profitable 
to import from Britain to the United States: 
.. 
Y  (1 + i"Jk'365  + c  1.  s,  < "[ 
where X  is the official dollar price of  one ounce of  "fine"  gold  as paid  or 
received by the U.S. Treasury (i.e., $20.67183),18  Y is the official pound ster- 
18. The official buying and selling prices of gold at the U.S.  Treasury were identical. By con- 
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ling price of one ounce of fine gold as paid or received by the Bank of England 
(i.e., &4.2409-&4.2477),19 XIY  is the official exchange rate or “mint parity” 
(i.e., $4.8666-$4.8744  per pound sterling), S, is the cable currency spot ex- 
change rate  (expressed  in dollars per  pound  sterling) at time t, reported  in 
London at the end of the first week of each month, and i,,,  the interest rate in 
the United  States, is the monthly average of  the weekly average call money 
rates in New York during the period of shipping. The interest cost is calculated 
during the period of voyage between London and New York. Following Clark 
(1984), I assume that the arbitrageur finances his gold shipments in his coun- 
try of residence. The direct shipping costs, c, consist of freight and insurance 
costs, packing, loading and unloading, abrasion, charges for assay and mint- 
ing, and, finally, incidental expenses. The costs are expressed as a percentage 
of the initial dollar investment. k is the transatlantic shipping time from Lon- 
don to New  York.  An import gold point (import to the United  States from 
Britain) is therefore expressed as 
In order to determine whether it is profitable to export gold from the United 
States, one has to take into account the exchange risk involved in receiving 
the proceeds of the gold shipment in foreign currencies at the end of the voy- 
age. For a voyage of given length, such risk can be eliminated by taking a 
forward exchange contract whereby pounds are converted into dollars at the 
rate F,  (dollars per pounds) at the date of the reception of the gold. Whenever 
the forward rate is greater than the official exchange rate discounted by the 
shipping cost, it is profitable to export gold from the United States: 
X 
Y 
F, > -  [(l + i,s)k/365 + c].  (3) 
Assuming that covered interest parity holds, I compute the forward rate F, 
for conversion of pounds into dollars at the date f  + k as 
(4) 
Thus, the gold export point becomes 
(5) 
The British interest rate used, i,,,  is the weekly average of the call money rate 
in London taken the first Friday of each month. 
19. These numbers are obtained from Einzig (193  1). The appropriate side of the spread is taken 
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I calculate the gold points using the average direct costs of Officer (1 889- 
1904: 0.65 percent;  1905-8:  0.5 percent).  Clark and  Officer differ in their 
calculations because the former does not include the cost of  abrasion, mint- 
ing, and assay. The duration of  the voyage between New York  and London 
was estimated to range between seven and fourteen days. Following Goodhart 
(1969), I assume a fixed length of ten days (i.e., k  = 10). I ignore commis- 
sions costs in the financial markets for lack of accurate data. 
To compute the gold points between Berlin and London and between Paris 
and London I use the same formulas as above but change both the time and 
the costs of shipping gold between the respective cities. Following  Einzig’s 
(1931) estimation  of  shipping  time  and  costs, I  take k  = 3 days between 
London and Berlin and k  = 1 day between London and Paris.  1 estimate the 
cost of shipping from London to Berlin to be c = 0.02 percent and the cost of 
shipping from London to Paris to be c = 0.025 percent. 
I  study the joint behavior of  interest rates, exchange rates,  and the gold 
points. The criteria adopted in the choice of interest rates are matching matu- 
rity,  international  tradability,  and  comparable  default-risk  characteristics. 
Given the data to which I had access, the securities that most closely approx- 
imate the above criteria are as follows: 
For Britain, the prime bill rate, of ninety-day maturity. It is the rate at which 
British banks discount “first-class” bills. Once banks have “accepted” such 
bills, they become tradable in a secondary market in London, where actors 
include discount houses and commercial banks.  The prime bill rates were 
almost identical to the rate of Treasury bills, which were not traded heavily 
until World War I (see Capie and Webber 1985). 
For the United States, the commercial  paper rate, of  sixty- to ninety-day 
maturity. It is issued in standard form by large distributors and manufactur- 
ers, is eligible for rediscount,  and has an active secondary market (see Ma- 
caulay 1938). 
For Germany, the market discount rate, of about ninety-day  maturity. This 
is the  secondary  market rate  for bills  accepted by  the  large incorporated 
banks and private banking houses (see Madden and Nadler 1935; and Bopp 
1953). 
For France, the market rate of discount, of maturities ranging from thirty 
days to six months.  The rates I used, taken from the U.S. National Mone- 
tary  Commission  (1910b) (which  does  not  specify  maturity),  were  very 
similar to the annual series of three-month rates reported by White (1933). 
This is  a rate  at  which  the  large commercial  banks  bought  in  the  mar- 
ket trade bills of the better quality. This secondary market was not as impor- 
tant as the London, New York, or Berlin bills markets because it lacked a 
strong  group of  intermediaries.  Although  most  bills  were  discounted  at 
the bank rate (which did not move for long periods of  time), the market 
rate  was  much  more sensitive to international  financial  news (see White 
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Foreign Exchange Markets and Fluctuation Bands during Bretton Woods 
For the Bretton Woods years,  I assembled spot exchange rates, bilateral 
fluctuation bands, and forward rates for the period July 1955-May  1971 (the 
time when the deutsche mark was floated), for the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and France relative to the United States. While official convertibility of  the 
pound, the deutsche mark, and the franc started only in  December 1958, a 
well-developed foreign exchange market had been allowed to operate since 
May  1953, when the authorities of eight European Payments Union members, 
including the three European countries mentioned above, agreed to standard- 
ize bilateral fluctuation margins to 75 percent on either side of their respective 
parities and permitted commercial banks to trade their currencies freely within 
those bounds (Yeager 1966). My sample begins in July 1955 since that is the 
date when the forward rates published by Grubel (1966) start. 
As I mentioned in section 2.3.3 above, the cornerstone of  the IMF rules 
was the system of  dollar or gold parities, around which spot exchange rates 
were  permitted to  fluctuate as far  as  1 percent in  either direction. Unlike 
the gold standard, under Bretton Woods bilateral fluctuation bands are fixed 
by law. 
A major difference between the Bretton Woods regime and the classical 
gold standard is the widespread use of capital controls in Bretton Woods. In 
many countries, international asset trade was encouraged only to the extent 
that it was needed to finance international goods trade. The IMF did not op- 
pose these restrictive practices. As shown by  Giovannini and Park (1992), if 
international trading firms cannot instantaneously shift their import and ex- 
port flows by unlimited amounts to adapt to changes in interest rates, this form 
of  restriction of capital account transactions induces wedges between interest 
rates in different countries. The implication is that domestic financial assets, 
like treasury bills and interbank deposits, cannot be considered internationally 
tradable, and differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates include 
the tariff equivalent of  the quantitative capital restrictions mentioned above. 
For this reason, rather than studying interest rate differentials, I concentrate 
on forward premia. Forward premia are accurate measures of  exchange-rate 
expectations to the extent that the required risk premia from foreign exchange 
speculation are small. Indeed, in the presence of capital controls, deviations 
from covered interest rate parity can be used as a tariff-equivalent measure of 
capital controls.20 
2.4.2  The Evidence 
The Gold Standard 
The gold  points represent valid bounds for the fluctuations of  exchange 
rates if all the transactions that are implied by them can take place at the given 
20. For a description of the data sources, see the appendix. 130  Albert0 Giovannini 
prices. A crucial link is the transactions with monetary authorities, exchang- 
ing gold for national currencies. The basic monetary rule of the gold standard 
is that monetary authorities should stand ready to exchange gold at the stated 
parity. 
Figure 2.2 reports logs of the spot exchange rates of the pound relative to 
the dollar, the reichsmark, and the franc, respectively, together with my esti- 
mates  of  the gold points. I use logs to highlight the size of the  fluctuation 
bands, which were less than 2 percent wide in the case of the dollar and less 
than 1 percent wide in the case of the franc and the reichsmark. Note also that 
the export (upper-bound) and import (lower-bound) points of gold fluctuate, 
especially in the case of the dollar. The estimates of the gold points  for the 
U.S. dollar (fig.  2.2~)  broadly match those of  Officer (1986).  The spot ex- 
change rate touches the gold export point only on one occasion,  in August 
1895, most likely corresponding to the collapse of the Morgan-Belmont syn- 
dicate. 
The reichsmark rate (fig. 2.2b) crosses the import points on a few occasions 
in the three years after the Baring crisis of November  1890. The export point 
is touched in 1900, a year when stock prices collapsed and many banks failed. 
A minor panic followed in December of that year. In March  1907, when an- 
other violation of  the gold point is observed in figure 2.2b, stock prices de- 
clined in Berlin and triggered a chain of bankruptcies.  The franc crosses the 
gold point more often, but never by large amounts. Notice in particular the 
instance in the beginning of  1889, at the time of  the collapse of  the Bourse 
caused by the Panama Canal failure (January) and the breakdown of the cop- 
per comer (March). 
Are the crossings of  the gold points to be interpreted  as unexploited arbi- 
trage profit opportunities? I am reluctant to take that position, especially be- 
cause my calculations do not account for commissions in financial markets. It 
is conceivable that, in periods of great uncertainty, these commissions widen 
considerably, thus widening the gold points. 
Figure 2.3 plots the U.S., German, and French interest rates together with 
bounds implied by the gold points. The two bounds are derived as follows. If 
the gold export point observed in any month is regarded by investors as the 
maximum value that the exchange rate can take over the maturity  of  short- 
term financial instruments,  and if risk premia and other ex ante rate-of-return 
differentials are second order, then the interest rate on dollar, mark, and franc 
assets can never exceed the following value: 
R, =  (1 + R,*)  ~  - 1  1,  1  s, 
21. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963); Garber and Grilli (1986) also provide a discussion of 
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where S  denotes the gold export point, R:  is the rate of  return on sterling 
financial assets in the money market, and S, is the spot sterling exchange rate 
at time t. Similarly, the dollar, mark, and franc money-market interest rates 
can never be lower than 
(7)  R, =  (1 + R?)'  - 1  [  s,  l7 
where S is the gold import point. 
R, and R, are observable at every time t. If the actual interest rates denomi- 
nated in dollars, marks, and francs at t are outside these two bounds, either 
the margins are not credible-that  is, agents expect that, over the maturity of 
the interest rates considered, the exchange rate can cross the margins-or 
required (ex ante) rate-of-return differentials are nonzero (I assumed them to 
be zero to derive the upper and lower bounds for the interest rates). 
The assumption maintained in  these calculations is that investors do not 
require, ex ante, significantly different returns on assets denominated in differ- 
ent currencies. In other words, I assume that foreign exchange risk premia are 
insignificant. This assumption is corroborated by the lack of ability of  asset- 
pricing models to deliver sizable risk premia, given realistic processes for the 
variables driving risk and return in international financial markets.22  Indeed, 
the observation that rate-of-return differentials in foreign exchange markets 
often seem to be highly persistent and therefore predictable might well be due 
to the phenomena discussed here, as, for example, in the famous case of the 
Mexican peso in 1976. 
A complication of these calculations is that, as noted above, the gold points 
fluctuate stochastically. Therefore, the appropriate thresholds for the calcula- 
tions of the credibility bounds for interest rates are represented by the expec- 
tation of the gold points prevailing at the end of the maturity of  the financial 
assets under consideration, under the assumption that gold parities are not 
changed.  In  practice,  the fluctuation of  bounds  reported in  figure 2.3 ac- 
counted for by  the fluctuation of  gold points cannot be recognized with the 
naked eye. To  verify this,  I reproduced the figure assuming constant gold 
points, equal to the average of the numbers computed above. The results thus 
obtained were indistinguishable from figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3~  shows that the dollar rate of interest is almost always within its 
credibility bounds.  The big exceptions are the May-August  1893 financial 
panic and the 1895-96  period. In May-August  1893, convertibility was sus- 
pended; later, a number of large nonfinancial businesses went bankrupt, and 
stock prices declined. In the second half of  1895, the Belmont-Morgan syn- 
dicate collapsed (see above); in 1896, there was a bank panic with a decline 
in stock prices. In general, U.S. interest rates hover consistently close to the 
22.  A discussion of the evidence on risk premia in foreign exchange markets appears in Dorn- 
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upper bound. In the case of the reichsmark, reported in figure 2.3b, the upper 
credibility bound is surpassed clearly in 1907, a time of financial crisis in the 
United States; this was accompanied by stock price declines and business fail- 
ures in Berlin. In the case of the franc (fig. 2.3c),  the crossing of the bounds 
occurs mostly-but  not by large amounts-at  the lower level, except for the 
January  1889 stock exchange collapse due to the Panama Canal crisis men- 
tioned above. 
In general, figure 2.3 suggests that the international comovement of interest 
rates was substantial and could very well be due to the credibility of the gold 
standard,  which  induced the belief  that exchange rates could not cross the 
gold points. 
Figure 2.4 contains scatter plots,  relating the percentage deviation  of  the 
spot exchange rate from the middle of the gold points to the interest rate dif- 
ferential. Under the hypothesis that the gold standard rules stabilize expecta- 
tions, such a relation should be negative: the expected exchange-rate change 
decreases whenever the spot exchange rate reaches the upper fluctuation limit, 
and vice versa. The figure shows that the relation is positive for the U.S.  dollar 
and negative for the reichsmark and the franc. For all three currencies, such a 
relation is, however, not significant. 
The absence of a negative relation between interest rate differentials and the 
position of the exchange rate within the band raises a question about the cred- 
ibility of  the bands. Indeed, one would expect this relation not to be negative 
whenever  agents forecast either suspensions of  convertibility or changes in 
gold panties. Expectations of parity adjustments would interfere with the ex- 
pectation of mean reversion of the exchange rates induced by the presence of 
the band. In this specific sense, the rules of convertibility under the gold stan- 
dard would not have much stabilizing power. 
To obtain more precise estimates of  expectations of parity adjustments,  I 
rely on the method originally  developed  by Rose and  Svensson  (1991) and 
Svensson (1991) and  modified  by  Chen  and  Giovannini  (1991).  The time- 
varying  conditional  expectation  of  devaluations  is  obtained  by  subtracting 
from the interest rate differential 95 percent confidence bounds for the condi- 
tional expectation of exchange-rate depreciation within the fluctuation band. 
The latter is computed, as in Chen and Giovannini (1991), from the projection 
of a nonlinear transformation  of the exchange rate within the band into vari- 
ables in agents’ information  The nonlinear transformation is a way of 
23. Specifically, let x, be the percent deviation of the exchange rate from the center of the band 
at month t. LetL be the half width of the band, and lety,,,  = In[(L + x,+,)/(L  -  x,,,)].  I project 
Y,+~  on information available at month t (including x,, the three-month interest rate differential, y:  , 
and y;)  since the interest rates I use have a maturity of three months.  I then obtain conditional 
expectations for the left-hand-side variable and 95 percent confidence intervals for the conditional 
expectation. These are transformed to obtain 95 percent confidence intervals for x,+?.  The confi- 
dence intervals of the future exchange rates within the fluctuation bands are then subtracted from 
the interest rate differentials (adjusted by the current position of the exchange rate in the band) to 
obtain 95 percent confidence intervals for the expected devaluation. In the case of  the gold stan- Interest-Rate Differential 
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making sure that agents actively exploit the information about the existence 
of the gold points. 
The results for these calculations are a band for the null hypothesis  of no 
changes in convertibility rules or gold parities expected for month 7.  The null 
hypothesis is not rejected whenever zero is included in the bands’ interval at 
month 7.  These bands are reported in figure 2.5.  Only in the case of the U.S. 
dollar can the 95 percent confidence intervals be seen to move away from zero 
by sizable amounts, in the two years noted above, 1893 and 1895. This is not 
the case with the reichsmark and the franc, despite the fact that, for these two 
currencies, fluctuation bands are roughly half the size of the dollar fluctuation 
bands. Thus, figure 2.5 is consistent with the evidence from the scatter plots: 
figure 2.4a above shows that the relation between the interest rate differential 
and the position of the dollar/sterling rate in the band is positive (but insignif- 
icant), unlike the case of the franc and the reichsmark. The absence of a sta- 
bilizing feature of the dollar/sterling gold points is most likely caused by the 
sizable fluctuations in expected gold parity changes. 
The Bretton Woods Regime 
Figure 2.6 reports the three-month forward rates-deutsche  marks per dol- 
lar,  sterling per  dollar,  French  franc per  dollar-together  with the Bretton 
Woods fluctuation bands for the three currencies. This figure is equivalent to 
the plots of interest rates and credibility bounds reported for the gold standard. 
If the forward rate is a good proxy for the expected future spot exchange rate, 
a movement  of the forward rate beyond the Bretton Woods limit indicates a 
lack of credibility of the fixed-exchange-rate system. 
In the case of the deutsche mark (fig. 2.6a),  the forward rate goes out of the 
bounds immediately after the 1961 realignment and, more noticeably, before 
the October  1969 revaluation. The 1969 episode was noted (Argy 1981) as a 
franc-mark crisis, characterized by heavy speculative activity involving these 
two currencies.  Figure 2.6~  shows that, before the franc devaluation of Au- 
gust  1969,  the forward rate reaches the upper fluctuation band  for that cur- 
rency. Figure 2.6~  also shows that the largest deviation of  the forward rate 
from the  Bretton Woods bounds for the French franc occurs in September, 
November, and December 1956 at the time of the Algeria and Suez crises. The 
experience of sterling is reported in figure 2.6b. The forward rate exceeds the 
upper fluctuation  limit at the time of the Suez crisis and, significantly, after 
dard, the procedure is complicated because gold points have not been fixed over the years, and 
some violations of  the gold points are observed. This complication is bypassed by  taking the 
average gold points to compute the dependent variable in the projection equation described above 
and taking the very  few violations of  the gold points to be almost on the edge of  the newly 
computed band. Such manipulations of  the data are, in a sense, consistent with the observation 
noted above: the observed “violations” of the gold points might actually not be such since the 
computed gold points do not account for financial commissions, and these might have been partic- 
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the November  1967 devaluation of sterling. As Tew (1977) notes, however, 
the Bank of England intervened in the forward market for sterling from the 
last quarter of  1964 to the devaluation of  1967. Whether these interventions 
were successful at keeping the forward premium below the level that reflected 
expectations of devaluation of sterling remains an open question. 
Figure 2.7 shows the scatter relations between the percentage deviations of 
spot exchange rates from central parities and forward premia for the deutsche 
mark and sterling. (An equivalent figure for the French franc is missing be- 
cause of data problems with the market spot exchange rate for that country.) 
For both currencies, the diagrams do not show any systematic relation. Once 
again, this result might be due to the substantial fluctuations of the expected 
changes in the central parities of both the deutsche mark and sterling, reported 140  Albert0 Giovannini 
in figure 2.8. The figure reproduces calculations from Chen and Giovannini 
(1991), along the lines described above.24  In the case of both currencies, there 
are significant and sizable expectations of parity realignments toward the end 
of the sample. In the case of the deutsche mark, expectations of  revaluation 
are also observed in correspondence to the March 1961 realignment. 
2.4.3  Discussion of the Evidence 
The evidence presented above can be summarized as follows. For the gold 
standard period, we find that fluctuation bands are particularly narrow in the 
case of European currencies (the reichsmark and the franc) while the dollar/ 
sterling band is of comparable magnitude to that of Bretton Woods. The nar- 
row European bands appeared to be quite effective in linking sterling, franc, 
and mark interest rates. There is some evidence of  stability of  expectations 
induced by the bands, measured by a negative correlation between the interest 
rate differential and the position of exchange rates in the bands. This negative 
correlation, however, is not very strong in the sample. Tests of credibility of 
the convertibility rules do not seem to indicate that sizable violations of con- 
vertibility rules were expected to occur in the case of the franc and the reichs- 
mark. 
In the case of Bretton Woods, the stabilizing properties of fluctuation bands 
appear to be even weaker than in the case of the gold standard-witness  the 
less systematic relations between forward premia and the position of the ster- 
ling and deutsche mark exchange rates in  the bands. Estimates of  expected 
exchange-rate realignments appear sizable and significant toward the end of 
the Bretton Woods period and surely explain, at least in part, the absence of 
systematic evidence of the stabilizing properties of the bands. 
The natural question raised by  this evidence is, Was  the gold standard a 
more credible regime than Bretton Woods? The discussion of  the historical 
record suggests a positive reply, but the statistical evidence presented above is 
inconclusive. The evidence is inconclusive because it is a comparison of the 
two regimes that does not explicitly account for the exogenous shocks hitting 
the countries included in the samples. Hence, the evidence cannot tell whether 
a world economy that functions under a gold standard can withstand turbu- 
lence better than a world economy functioning under a Bretton Woods-type 
regime. 
Despite the fact that the evidence presented above cannot be exploited to 
make statements about the relative credibility of  the two regimes, the covari- 
ation of  national interest rates during the gold standard seems particularly 
striking. It is striking because of the size of the fluctuation bands implied by 
24. In this case, the variables included in the projection equations were various dummies cor- 
responding to the subperiods when given parities were prevailing, y,, $,  $,  the interest rate differ- 
ential, and the log of relative money supplies. 141  Bretton Woods and Its Precursors 
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the gold points. On average, the gold points’ fluctuation bands for European 
currencies were about half those prevailing during the Bretton Woods years 
for the same European currencies relative to the dollar. Despite these narrow 
bands,  interest  rate  differentials  very  rarely  reflected  expectations  of 
exchange-rate changes outside the band. While the maturity of  the interest 
rates somewhat decreases the power of  the credibility tests of  the previous 
section, it should be recalled that, for example, in the case of the European 
Monetary System, fluctuation bands are as wide as 4.5 percent, yet  three- 
month interest rates have violated them in several instances  .25 
25. For a discussion of the credibility of EMS bands, see, Giovannini (1990). 142  Albert0 Giovannini 
2.5  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has looked at the Bretton Woods system from the perspective of 
a theory of the history of international monetary systems based on rules and 
discretion in monetary policy. 
An application of the rules-cum-escape clauses view of the history of the 
world monetary system runs into a number of problems. First, it is not clear 
that the model can be applied as is to fixed-exchange-rate regimes under a fiat 
currency system. The difficulty of associating fixed exchange rates with mon- 
etary rules is a crucial one, given that the Bretton Woods regime cannot be 
likened to a commodity  standard: banknotes were not convertible into gold; 
monetary  authorities  were  not  required  to  intervene  in  the  gold  market. 
Hence, even conceptually, it is not clear whether the return to fixed exchange 
rates after World War I1 is to be considered a reinstatement of a monetary rule. 
The second, and probably most serious, problem of this theory of the world 
monetary system comes from an analysis of the historical record on the setup 
of the Bretton Woods institutions. In the second postwar period, policymakers 
brushed aside the concept that credible monetary commitments are valuable- 
a concept  used to justify the  return to gold in  the interwar years-and  at- 
tempted to substitute some form of monetary policy coordination for the fixed 
convertibility rules of the gold standard. This compromise solution was prob- 
ably caused by the keen resistance of the British delegation to any codification 
in the IMF Articles of Agreement of rules that would have forced a degree of 
monetary  discipline  on individual member  countries’  monetary  authorities. 
Hence, this compromise solution is the best evidence that the return to fixed 
exchange  rates in  the  second postwar  period  was not considered to be  the 
reestablishment of monetary rules over discretion. 
An analysis of the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates under the 
gold standard and Bretton Woods indicates that, at times of large shocks, of- 
ficial parities were not credible.  In general, however, the statistical evidence 
is ambiguous on whether monetary rules have been credible under the gold 
standard and the Bretton Woods regime or on whether one regime was more 
credible than the other. Yet the data show that the very narrow gold standard 
bands contributed to keeping European interest rates within narrow margins 
for many years. However, the emergence of significant realignment expecta- 
tions in a number of cases is evidence not inconsistent with the rules-cum- 
escape clauses view of the world. 
In sum, this paper has shown that there might be value in credible monetary 
rules, witnessed by the stability of interest rates in a number of different peri- 
ods, but that the return to fixed rates after World War I1 was not inspired by 
the desire to reinstate credible international monetary rules.  This was prob- 
ably because  the interwar experience  made the return  to gold anachronistic 
and, as reiterated by the 1982 Gold Commission, impractical. The alternative 
sought out by the builders of the IMF was, however, not very credible. 143  Bretton Woods and Its Precursors 
The rejection of the rules-cum+xape  clauses model raises the question of 
an alternative interpretation of the evolution of  the world monetary system. 
How then do we interpret the periodic returns to fixed exchange rates? Several 
authors do not seem to subscribe to the theory of rules and discretion explain- 
ing the abandoning of and the return to the gold standard. For example, Dorn- 
busch  and Frenkel (1984), following Keynes (1930),  have argued that gold 
convertibility was always suspended if there was a need. Like Keynes, Dorn- 
busch and Frenkel do not claim that the resumption of convertibility was mo- 
tivated by the value of the gold standard as a rule: while concentrating on the 
ease with which rules were abandoned, they are silent on the reasons to re- 
adopt them. They would probably subscribe to Temin’s (1991) view that the 
gold standard was just regarded as the “normal” way of operating the world 
monetary system. 
One alternative  to the  simple escape clause model  probably  inspired the 
officials who amended Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement (French 
and U.S. delegations in Rambouillet in November  1975 [Williamson 1977]), 
allowing  countries  to  choose  the  exchange-rate  regime  they  please.  This 
theory is based on a Poole-like analysis of output fluctuations under alterna- 
tive exchange-rate regimesz6  and stresses the role of different shocks and their 
transmission under fixed and flexible rates as the main determinants of the 
choice of  fixing  or floating  a country’s currency.  In a nutshell,  this theory 
states that, when LM shocks prevail, fixed exchange rates are superior, while 
floating rates are more desirable when IS shocks are more frequent. I do not 
know of attempts at applying this theory to the historical record, and I suspect 
that such attempts could be arduous, given the difficulty in identifying IS ver- 
sus LM shocks. 
I would propose a second alternative,  inspired by several observations  of 
Milton Friedman’s (see, e.g., Friedman  1968). According to this view, fixed 
rates, as well as floating rates, are abandoned because governments “try to do 
too much” with monetary policy  instruments,  necessarily  lead monetary re- 
gimes to strains or a breakdown, and are then drawn to experiment with alter- 
native  arrangements.  In  other words,  this  view  maintains  that,  in  modern 
economies,  the pressures on monetary  authorities to affect the allocation of 
resources  probably  far exceed  the  actual ability of monetary  authorities to 
affect the real economy, given the instruments at their disposal. This tension 
is what generates cycles in monetary regimes. 
An exploration of these alternative models is called for to help refine the 
theory of monetary institutions and improve our understanding of the history 
of the international monetary system. 
26. For an illustration, see Obstfeld (1988). 144  Albert0 Giovannini 
Appendix 
Data Sources 
The Gold Standard 
The period covered is January 1889-December  1908. The U.S. National 
Monetary Commission (1910b) volumes have been used  for the following 
data: 
Britain, weekly average call money rate reported the first Friday of every 
month (table 18, pp. 43-62). 
France, market rates of discount reported the first Thursday of each month 
from weekly averages (table 4, pp. 315-16). 
London,  spot  exchange  rates  for  dollar/pound,  marklpound,  and  franc/ 
pound reported the end of the first week of each month (the monthly data 
between 1889 and 1898 are in table 3, pp. 67-69,  and the weekly data from 
1899 to 1908 are in table 4, pp. 70-74). 
The U.S. call money rate and the U.S. commercial paper rate are reported 
in  Macaulay  (1938). The original source is the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle and its Financial Review. The data I use are in Macaulay’s appendix 
(pp. A150-AI54).  Both the call money rates and the commercial paper rates 
are given monthly and represent averages of  weekly data. The commercial 
paper rates have maturities of sixty to ninety days. 
The British prime bank bill rate is reported in Capie and Weber (1985, table 
III.[lO], col. V,  pp. 509-12).  The original source is the Economist. The data 
are end-of-month figures and have a maturity of three months. 
The German market rates of discount are reported in Bopp (1953, app., pp. 
79-87).  They are monthly averages of  market discount rates. The original 
source is Die Reichsbank, 1876-1910. 
The estimation of  the costs and duration of  shipping between  London, 
Paris, and Berlin is based on the calculations of Einzig (193  1, app., pp. 148- 
54). For the costs and duration of the voyage between London and New York, 
I follow the estimations of Clark (1984) and Officer (1986). 
Bretton Woods 
The data for the spot exchange rates and the three-month forward exchange 
rates for the United Kingdom, Germany, and France from January 1957 to 
December 1960 are reported in  Grubel (1966). All rates are end-of-month 
figures for weekly averages of daily observations. The original sources of the 
data are the Dresdner Bank, Samuel Montagu’s Review of  Foreign Exchanges, 
and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. 
British, German, and French spot and forward exchange rates from January 
1961 to May 1971 were obtained from the IMF’s international Financial Sta- 
tistics. All rates are end-of-month figures. The spot rates are market rates, and 145  Bretton Woods and Its Precursors 
the three-month  forward rates are reported as annual discounts or premiums 
on the spot rates. 
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Comment  Anna J. Schwartz 
Models that stress the superiority of rules over discretion or of  rules with an 
escape clause interpret the evolution of international monetary regimes as one 
in which floating exchange rates, equated with discretion, are temporary ar- 
rangements that countries resort to when large shocks hit the world economy. 
Otherwise, in the  absence of such shocks, countries prefer fixed exchange 
rates since fixed rates signify that monetary authorities operate under a rule. 
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The rule insulates the monetary regime from either fiscal pressures to inflate 
or its own attempts to affect output by monetary surprises, which in any event 
are frustrated by the public’s anticipations of such behavior. A credible rule 
moderates and stabilizes the public’s expectations of inflation, and, if inflation 
is deemed costly, equilibrium under a rule dominates equilibrium under a dis- 
cretionary regime. 
According to the models, a cyclical movement can be traced from the fixed 
exchange  rates of  the gold standard before World War  I; to its breakdown 
owing to the wartime shock; to the interwar return to the gold standard, fol- 
lowed by its breakdown owing to the shocks of the Great Depression and of 
World War 11; followed by fixed exchange rates under Bretton Woods and their 
breakdown  owing to the shocks of the Viet Nam War and the oil cartel. On 
this reckoning,  a cyclical shift to fixed exchange rates should be expected. 
Indeed, proponents of the models note that fixed exchange rates have been a 
goal of policymakers within and outside the European Monetary System. 
At the outset of the paper, Giovannini poses a series of questions with re- 
gard to such models of the international monetary  system over the last one 
hundred years. To  answer the questions, he examines the historical record and 
empirical evidence. His objective is to see if he can find support for the mod- 
els in these sources. The questions and the answers follow. 
1. Does the distinction between rules and discretion provide a satisfactory 
framework for interpreting the evolution of  international monetary regimes? 
Giovannini’s answer is that, given that credible monetary rules are effective 
because they stabilize expectations, a sequence of rules and discretion is pos- 
sible if rules are abandoned only under exceptional circumstances, which can 
be unambiguously identified by both authorities and the public, and reinstated 
after a reasonably predictable length of time. 
2. Can a fixed exchange-rate  system without a nominal anchor be likened 
to a monetary rule? His answer is that, even without a nominal anchor, fixed 
exchange rates are more credible than any other monetary target and that, if 
the international system promotes monetary restraint, they can be likened to a 
monetary rule. In addition, an independent central bank, managed by a con- 
servative governor, approximates a monetary policy rule in a fixed-exchange- 
rate system without a nominal anchor. 
3. Is pegging a currency to a low-inflation country more credible than main- 
taining a low monetary growth rate under floating exchange rates? His answer 
is that pegging a currency to a low-inflation  country is more credible than 
maintaining a low monetary growth rate because the exchange rate is a visible 
target and the public knows exactly when the rule is suspended. 
4. Can floating exchange rates be regarded as a temporary suspension of 
rules, as proposed by the model of rules with an escape clause? His answer is 
that floating rates can be regarded as a temporary suspension of rules if the 
public believes that fixed rates will be reinstated when a set of objective and 
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5. Were  gold  standard convertibility rules visible? To  test  whether gold 
standard convertibility rules  were visible,  Giovannini plots  spot exchange 
rates of the pound relative to the dollar, the reichsmark, and the French franc, 
within  his estimates of  the upper-bound  gold  export point  and  the lower- 
bound gold import point between New York and London, Berlin and London, 
Paris and London, monthly 1889-1908. Bilateral parities were almost always 
credible in the case of the European currencies, but the dollar-sterling parities 
indicate that violations of convertibility rules were expected to occur. Hence, 
he regards statistical evidence on the credibility of the gold standard as incon- 
clusive. 
I have no problems with the answers given by  Giovannini to the first four 
questions, but his answer to this question, I believe, is mistaken. The viola- 
tions of convertibility rules that he generalizes were confined to the period 
from 1890 to 1896 in the United States when silver politics threatened to drive 
it off  the gold standard. Except for this episode, the statistical evidence, far 
from being ambiguous, as he states, confirms that monetary rules were cred- 
ible under the gold standard. That is also the significance of the striking co- 
variation of national interest rates during the pre-World  War I gold standard, 
to which he refers. 
6. Was  the restoration of  the interwar gold standard regarded as a return 
to rules rather than to normalcy? Giovannini has no opinion on whether the 
interwar restoration of  the gold standard reflected the view  that it was the 
“normal” way  of operating the world monetary system rather than the view 
that a rule-based system was what was sought. I shall comment on this ques- 
tion in my conclusion. 
7. Was  the Bretton Woods system designed to commit authorities to price 
stability? Was it a more or less credible regime than the pre-World  War I gold 
standard? Giovannini believes that monetary discipline was  not  among the 
objectives that the founders of the Bretton Woods system sought, and I agree 
with him. Despite movements of  the three-month forward rates of deutsche 
marks,  sterling, and the French franc, each per dollar, outside the Bretton 
Woods fluctuation bands,  suggesting lack of  credibility, he  is unwilling to 
compare Bretton Woods and its prewar predecessor since he is unable to im- 
pound the shocks that supervened in each regime. In my  view, the gold stan- 
dard rules  were binding,  hence the regime’s aura of  inviolability. Bretton 
Woods never achieved that degree of official and public acceptance. Yet  it does 
not follow that the prewar gold standard could be reinstated under present 
conditions. 
Giovannini’s final conclusion is  that  the paradigm  of  rules  with  escape 
clauses does not fit either the Bretton Woods or subsequent experience. He 
suggests that one possible explanation is that the role of transmission of differ- 
ent shocks has been the main determinant of  the choice of fixed or  floating 
exchange rates. He prefers an alternative possibility, however, as that deter- 
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authorities make inappropriate use of their instruments to affect the real econ- 
omy. The solution for authorities, on this view, is to try a different exchange- 
rate regime. 
In summary, the paper has many attractive features. It covers a broad sweep 
of  international  monetary  history,  gives an  account of  various  analytic ap- 
proaches that study it, and exploits a body of data to measure the success of 
two monetary regimes, each in terms of its own prescriptions. 
I share Giovannini’s skepticism that it is accurate to interpret one hundred 
years  of  international  monetary  history  in light of  one overarching theme. 
Efforts to interpret international monetary history as a reflection of one over- 
arching theme impose on the past a view that those who experienced it did not 
know. In particular, I doubt that, for gold standard adherents, it was a contin- 
gent rule and that, for gold standard opponents, the objective was its replace- 
ment by another rule rather than by discretion. The assumption that countries 
are now ready to embrace fixed exchange rates because they embody credible 
monetary commitments  flies in the face of the widespread acceptance of an 
activist role  for governments,  certainly  since the Great  Depression,  if  not 
since World War I. 
Comment  Charles Wyplosz 
Alberto Giovannini has produced another challenging paper. His purpose is to 
provide the backbone of a theory of  the evolution of international monetary 
systems. His thinking must have been prompted by the prospect of traveling 
to Bretton Woods while reading some recent work on escape clauses. Looking 
at the trade-off between rules, which provide credibility, and discretion, which 
allows  for  stabilization  policies,  this  literature  imagines  a  halfway  house 
where rules are in force but where escape clauses allow for discretion under 
well-defined  special circumstances. I  Applying  this  idea to the  international 
monetary system is tempting. The gold standard stopped in 1914 under a very 
special circumstance.  The Bretton Woods system ceased to exist in the wake 
of the supply shocks-not  just oil prices but virtually all commodity prices- 
of the early 1970s. 
Giovannini’s conclusion is that the data do not fit the facts as seen through 
the prism of  escape clauses.  He finds no evidence that the Bretton  Woods 
system ever achieved much anti-inflation credibility and that the credibility of 
the gold standard was quite limited. Although one may have qualms about his 
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testing procedure-he  does not really test credibility for lack of alternatives- 
I believe that his conclusion will withstand challenges. In fact, the main rea- 
son why I am so ready to accept the empirical results is that I am surprised 
that he even tried this approach. In my  view, there are at least three reasons 
why the escape clause theory of the evolution of international monetary sys- 
tems is a nonstarter, at least at this stage of our understanding. 
First, the literature shows that it is not true, in general, that exchange-rate 
regimes incorporating escape clauses dominate pure flexible or pure fixed- 
exchange-rate regimes. This is natural. In the spirit of  Poole’s analysis, in a 
world of trade-offs there is no dominant solution under all circumstances. If 
the stochastic properties of shocks change, a solution that was superior may 
turn out to be inferior. Short of full state contingency, there can be no domi- 
nant system for all weather. 
Second, escape clause models consider when to change exchange rates, not 
exchange-rate regimes. That realignments should be resisted in front of small 
shocks and accepted in the face of large shocks is a very different result from 
the one that Giovannini wishes to draw. For example, if a large shock occurs, 
it may be better to give up exchange-rate fixity and float. But is it forever, and, 
if  not, for how long? The existing literature applies the rule-versus-discretion 
problem to day-to-day monetary policy-making, not (yet) dealing with the 
kind of reputation equilibria that best describe regimes. What this line of  in- 
quiry suggests to me is that there is no such thing as a credible permanently 
fixed, or permanently floating, exchange-rate regime. The time-consistency 
problem strikes again. 
Third, I have grave reservations about using a one-country model to think 
about the world monetary order. The smallest structure I would recommend 
includes two countries contemplating an exchange-rate regime between them- 
selves. Then it becomes clear that the extension from rates to regimes that 
Giovannini implicitly considers gives the wrong answers. Imagine that the 
two countries are identical in terms of structures and tastes and that they adopt 
a fixed-exchange-rate regime cum escape clause. What shock would trigger 
the clause? Not necessarily large shocks, as presumed by Giovannini and ob- 
served in 1914 or in the early 1970s. If  the shocks are identical, the optimal 
policy reaction will be identical in both countries, and exchange-rate fixity is 
the best outcome. What will trigger the clause is a large asymmetric shock. 
That is not enough, however, to draw conclusions about the world monetary 
order. Two-country models go a long way, but in this case not far enough. For 
if we now imagine n countries-n  being large-for  the escape clause to be 
invoked we would probably need shocks that are asymmetric to a large pro- 
portion of countries, something that looks like a zero-probability event. 
Not only is the existing escape clause theory ill suited to the task, but casual 
observation of events also indicate that the intuitions that it provides are not 
helpful in this instance. A few examples may help make my point. The gold 
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an  asymmetric  shock? Probably  not  very  asymmetric.  Clearly,  there  were 
deeper reasons for the system to collapse. Of course, boats carrying gold were 
not able to sail, but it is also likely that foes were thoroughly  unwilling  to 
share a monetary system. Concerning the interwar gold exchange system, it is 
hard to imagine the Great Depression as a credibility-enhancing strategy. Nor 
can the demise of  the gold exchange  system be  safely contemplated  as an 
optimal policy response to large asymmetric shocks. 
The end of the Bretton Woods system well illustrates my point that one- 
country models cannot capture the evolution of  international monetary sys- 
tems. This volume makes it clear, I believe, that two links came under stress. 
The gold-dollar link dissolved not because of one shock but because of accu- 
mulated dollar balances. The dollar-other currency link dissolved because of 
accumulated inflation differentials. 
General Discussion 
There was considerable discussion on whether the Bretton Woods system was 
rules based. Allan Meltzer argued that Keynes was not a believer in discretion. 
He was opposed to the automatic operation of the classical gold standard rule 
because it led to procyclical money supply behavior and because it did not 
allow Britain to follow its domestic objectives.  However, Keynes attempted 
to set up a rule-based managed-exchange-rate system. The rules in his propos- 
als included extensive restrictions on the behavior of surplus nations, leading 
to the scarce currency clause in the Articles and the use of exchange controls. 
Sebastian Edwards also viewed Bretton Woods as a rule-based system, but 
he argued that the credibility of commitment to the rules was shattered by the 
1949 devaluation, when twenty-seven countries-many  of which did not face 
a  situation  of  fundamental  disequilibrium-followed  Britain  in  devaluing. 
Stanley Fischer was not surprised that the British were opposed to following 
rules. They opposed having their domestic policy options constrained as they 
had been under the gold standard. He viewed the discretionary regime of the 
past two decades as very  successful.  Willem Buiter viewed  the precommit- 
ment to rules as implying a technocratic dictatorship inconsistent with democ- 
racy-where  the public has the right to change its mind. He felt that the Bret- 
ton  Woods  architects  shared  similar  views.  Richard  Portes  cited  recent 
evidence by Alogoskoufis and Smith (American Economic Review [December 
19911) on the greater persistence of inflation under the gold standard and Bret- 
ton Woods compared to the other subperiods as evidence for the credibility of 
the rules. Alberto Alesina viewed Bretton Woods as a contingent rule-based 
system.  He agreed with both  the Bordo and the Giovannini  papers that the 
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equilibrium  was not well specified.  But  Bretton  Woods,  in contrast,  was a 
serious attempt to design a contingent rule system. 
Maurice  Obstfeld  disagreed  with  a  statement by  Giovannini  that, under 
Bretton Woods, central banks intervened in the gold market at their discretion. 
He viewed  the $35.00 gold clause  as central to the system as the  nominal 
anchor. It was taken seriously by the major participants as witnessed by the 
creation of the Gold Pool in  1961. The breakdown of the Gold Pool and the 
creation of the two-tier system in 1968 was a serious breach of the rules. Both 
Robert Aliber and Rudiger Dornbusch made analogies to parenthood when 
discussing the design of an optimal framework of rules. 
Albert0 Giovunnini responded to Allan Meltzer by clarifying what he meant 
by rules. For him, rules should be designed to limit the incentive of the mon- 
etary authorities to inflate. In this sense, he argued, the British were strongly 
opposed to a rule-based system. This Page Intentionally Left Blank